-Says Petition for Declaratory Judgment would be better
By Jerromie S. Walters
Monrovia, Liberia – In a recent communication from former Solicitor General Cllr. Sayma Syrenius Cephus to Justice Kabineh Ja’neh regarding the ongoing legislative impasse in Liberia, Cllr. Cephus declared his reluctance to support the petition for a writ of Mandamus against the Majority Bloc.
He suggests instead that a Petition for Declaratory Judgment would be a more appropriate legal remedy. The former Solicitor General called for support in pursuing this alternative approach, which would allow the Supreme Court to review and interpret the constitutional violations at play.
The standoff involves the “Majority Bloc” and the Speaker of the House, prompting inquiries about the potential filing of a petition for a writ of Mandamus to compel legislative attendance by Article 33 of the 1986 Constitution.
Cllr. Cephus expressed his desire to see the deadlock resolved, allowing the House of Representatives to effectively conduct the business of the Liberian people. However, he expressed skepticism about the appropriateness of a writ of Mandamus as a legal remedy for the crisis. He cautioned that such a writ could be excessively intrusive and could undermine the doctrine of separation of powers as outlined in Article 3 of the Constitution, particularly when the issues at hand stem from the misinterpretation or misapplication of the House’s own rules.
“The Supreme Court of Liberia holds the constitutional authority to review and declare laws unconstitutional,” Cllr. Cephus noted, “But this power does not extend to usurping the legislature’s exclusive right to make and enforce its own rules.” He emphasized that any actions regarding the suspension, punishment, or expulsion of a member of the House should remain within the legislature’s jurisdiction, consistent with Articles 38 and 20(a) of the Constitution.
Cllr. Cephus further elaborated on the limitations of the judiciary in enforcing legislative compliance, stating, “For a writ of Mandamus to compel members of the House to attend a session is something of a judicial novelty that I find incomprehensible.” He pointed out the practical challenges of enforcing such a mandate without a police force to support it.
The former Solicitor General also referenced previous Supreme Court rulings, including Nixon v. United States and Ja’neh v. House of Representatives, to underscore the principle that the courts should not intervene in matters that are solely within the purview of another branch of government. He asserted that the power to compel attendance in the House is a legislative function that lies exclusively with the Speaker.
