-In Economic Sabotage Case
By Vaye Lepolu
MONROVIA – Former Minister of Finance and Development Planning Samuel D. Tweah Jr. took the witness stand this week in Criminal Court “C,” but instead of strengthening his defense, his testimony exposed fresh gaps in the high-profile economic case, according to prosecutors. Over two days—April 20 to 21, 2026—Tweah delivered a lengthy and technical defense that was quickly overshadowed by a series of contradictions and inconsistencies.
Prosecutors argue these discrepancies strike at the heart of his credibility before the jury. Tweah, who served from January 2018 to January 2024, faces charges alongside four former government officials for the alleged illegal authorization of more than L$1 billion and US$500,000 in public funds through the Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA). But rather than clarifying his role, Tweah’s testimony opened new questions about his decision-making, the legality of his actions, and the accuracy of his own explanations.
Tweah attempted to anchor his authority in two main instruments: the Public Financial Management (PFM) Law and the National Budget. However, as he walked the jury through his interpretation of these laws, his version of events repeatedly shifted—raising concerns that the former minister was attempting to redefine standard financial procedures to justify questionable transactions.
At one point, Tweah told the court that agency requests are not necessary for expenditure, insisting that the mere passage of the national budget gives him full power to spend. Earlier in his testimony, however, he had declared: “The request for resources is the most sufficient trigger for expenditure.” Prosecutors noted that these conflicting explanations suggested Tweah was reconstructing the law to fit his actions rather than describing the law as written.
One of the most glaring inconsistencies arose when Tweah insisted that emergency-related spending becomes fully legal once the National Security Council (NSC) approves it. He told the jury: “Once the NSC approves the intervention, the minister’s authority is complete.” However, the PFM Law explicitly requires that any spending exceeding the budget must be reported to the Legislature under Section 26. The former minister never said he reported the FIA-related transfers to lawmakers.
Prosecutors seized on this omission, arguing that NSC approval cannot override statutory reporting requirements. Tweah’s failure to mention legislative notification, they said, amounts to an admission of procedural breach. Throughout his testimony, Tweah tried to reassure the jury that the controversial “direct debit” mechanism used to move funds to the FIA was perfectly lawful. “Direct debit is not outside the budget circle,” he stated.
But he immediately contradicted himself by acknowledging: “It is not pre-allotted but may be allotted subsequently.” This left courtroom observers questioning: If something has no pre-allotment and no documented post-allotment, where exactly does it fall in the budget? Prosecutors argued that Tweah’s explanation confirmed the very point he was attempting to deny—that the transfers operated outside the proper budgetary process, at least for a period of time.
When confronted with the absence of written requests or documentation authorizing the FIA transfers, Tweah dismissed these gaps as irrelevant. He suggested investigators were too eager to label missing documents as evidence of wrongdoing, comparing it to assuming money is stolen simply because it is no longer visible.
But legal observers noted that in public finance—a system built on documentation—the absence of mandatory paperwork is itself a breach. Several lawyers in the courtroom observed that the former minister’s analogy undermined his own argument and exposed a misunderstanding of the accountability mechanisms within the PFM framework.
Tweah’s claim that the finance minister has absolute discretion over how, when, and whether funds are released also raised eyebrows. “That discretion rests solely with the minister,” he told the court. Lawyers immediately noted a flaw: the PFM Law conditions ministerial discretion on compliance with procedures, documentation, and reporting—not personal judgment.
By overstating his powers, Tweah unintentionally signaled that he may have acted outside the boundaries of the law, or at minimum, interpreted it more broadly than legally allowed. Tweah also attempted to justify the FIA payments by placing them under the umbrella of “emergency spending.” Yet the examples he cited—allocations to the National Elections Commission, the World Food Programme, and UNFPA for census support—were routine, predictable funding streams, not emergency allocations.
His attempt to equate them with FIA spending created confusion and weakened his credibility. Prosecutors suggested this contradiction indicated Tweah was retrofitting unrelated transactions to normalize the FIA payments. Across nearly two hours on the stand, Tweah’s testimony oscillated between legal interpretation, personal justification, and metaphors that often weakened rather than strengthened his defense. For jurors listening carefully, the inconsistencies—large and small—may prove damaging.
